

us; that they do not see any Palestinian armed role...

«During the war we tried to solve the crisis in relations, in order to have another opportunity to rebuild the tripartite alliance on a new basis, whereby the Palestinian partner can play an important and effective role. This is exactly what we are attempting to do now. The following points constitute the basis for rebuilding the alliance:

a) To preserve the Palestinian gun in Lebanon...This means the preservation of all the achievements of the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon...This will mean foiling the aims of the Zionist invasion of 1982, to destroy the infrastructure of the Palestinian national struggle...The PNSF realized early how vital this matter is. The PNSF was quick to present a working paper to regulate the Palestinian presence and Palestinian-Lebanese relations...

b) We understand that the non-Palestinian partners to the tripartite alliance have the right to present their point of view of the common relationship. Of course, the interests of all partners must be taken into consideration - I mean their interest in confronting the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary enemy...

c) In any such alliance, there is always room for minor contradictions and differing viewpoints. All partners must agree on the methods for solving such contradictions...»

Palestinian National Unity

«Concerning Palestinian national unity, the Central Committee of Fatah presented a memorandum expressing their viewpoint on this unity. Unfortunately, the memorandum confirmed our viewpoint about the deceptive way in which the Central Committee of Fatah deals with the question of national unity...

«Everyone knows that the major obstacle to national unity is the Amman accord...Fatah's memorandum ignores this subject...The public cancellation of the Amman accord is a precondition for national unity...

«There are some who believe that the abrogation of the Amman accord is possible while the official leadership of the PLO remains in the leadership. The PFLP holds no such conviction...However, we are ready to cooperate with all other organizations, including those outside the PNSF. The common denominator between us and them is the condemnation and abrogation of the Amman accord...»

The PNSF

«When the war of the camps broke out in May of this year, some thought that this would bring the PNSF to an end...In reality, what has happened is that the PNSF stood the test. This will not lead us to draw overly optimistic conclusions...The PNSF still faces a set of contradictions. I will give some examples:

a) In the PFLP we still believe that the base of Fatah is nationalist, despite the fact that it is still dependent on the leadership (the Central Committee), financially and militarily. Accordingly, we believe it is important to intensify dialogue with Fatah's base. The outcome will be that this base will line up with the PNSF...

b) There are still nationalist and democratic forces that remain outside the PNSF...This fact should not lead us to ignore them or escalate contradictions with them. We have to convince them to join the PNSF. If we fail, we have to try to find the common denominator between them and the PNSF...

c) The PFLP will comply with the political platform of the PNSF which clearly states that the aim of the PNSF is to return the PLO to the nationalist, anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist line. It is not to split the PLO, or to have two organizations...»

The Amman accord

«All Palestinian nationalist organizations, forces and personalities recognized the threats posed by the Amman accord...But there were some who claimed that the accord was dead and would remain dead...

«Now we can say, with proof in our hands, that the Palestinian right-wing, deviationist leadership and the Jordanian regime are still determined to pursue their policy: the US, unilateral policy...For example, the right-wing leadership and the Jordanian regime insisted on convening the Arab summit with a simple majority. Of course, their insistence stems from the fact that they needed an official Arab cover for the Amman accord which was signed on February 11, 1985...

«I differentiate between the serious determination of both the (PLO) leadership and the Jordanian regime to follow the US solution, and the actual results of their choice...After all, Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip will not be easy or even possible. However, the dangers and splits caused by the right-wing policy in the Palestinian

arena, should be evident. Herein lies the necessity of confronting that policy...How can we confront and defeat that policy?

«Our weapons are clear. First and foremost is the weapon of comprehensive, political, mass mobilization. This mobilization will create a Palestinian will able to besiege and destroy the right-wing line. To succeed in this task, we deemed it necessary for all organizations, forces and nationalist personalities to close ranks...I am talking about the PNSF and all other organizations opposed to the deviating line...

«A Palestinian peoples convention should be the apex of this mobilization process...We will call for such a convention in the name of the PNSF. Of course, the PNSF will propagate its political platform calling for the abrogation of the Amman accord and the overthrow of its proponents. After the convention, we are ready to take a common stand with the other organizations besides the PNSF members...

«To succeed in this policy, we think it is vital to elicit Arab support...We will consolidate the tripartite alliance (Lebanese nationalist-Palestinian-Syrian).. We will consolidate our relations with the Arab national movement...We call for a summit of the confrontation and steadfastness states...We will call for an Arab peoples convention to back up the Palestinian one...»

The Casablanca Summit

«The convening of the Arab summit in Casablanca, was meant to provide a cover for the Amman accord...The USA wanted Arab support for that accord. The cover was given in an implicit form...If you ask me why it was not given explicitly, my answer will be that America's Arabs are not willing to enter into an overt confrontation with Syria and other Arab nationalist states...»

The Damascus agreement

«The implementation of the Damascus agreement (to stop the war of the camps) is going well...There are still some obstacles to its full implementation...For example, there are still some Palestinian prisoners who have not been released. Not all forces of Amal and the Lebanese Army Sixth Brigade have withdrawn from all positions around the camps...The reconciliation process has not yet occurred...»