essential for Israeli security. Likud's implementation of the Camp David accords in fact proved that Israel only relinquished the Sinai to improve conditions for holding on to the other territories occupied in 1967. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon was to a great extent launched in hopes that crushing the PLO there would make it easier for Israel to retain the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Israel retreated from most of Lebanon only because the Palestinian-Lebanese National Resistance made the new superexpansionism too costly in army casualties and loss of social consensus. In contrast, it took Egypt ten years to regain Taba, even after signing a peace treaty with Israel.

All in all, the territorial option appears to have enormous resilience in Israeli security thinking, despite growing awareness of its drawbacks, particularly in terms of increasingly heavy defense burdens. For example, Mroz reported: «Numerous Israelis have pointed out that, prior to the 1967 war... a force of a few thousand troops was sufficient to guard its borders. In contrast, several divisions of tens of thousands of soldiers are required for the same duties today» (op. cit., p. 119).

With the onset of the intifada, Israel has been forced to station more troops in the West Bank than were originally needed to conquer it. Moreover, the army in engaged in the process of reconquering liberated villages time after time. «The Israeli soldiers cannot retreat or even fail to advance, for loss of control over so much as a few square feet of public space gives the Palestinian state physical reality» (Anne Joyce, *American-Arab Affairs*, Winter 1988-89).

SETTLEMENTS AS SECURITY?

In Zionist strategy, settlements obviously derive from the need to control territory, backing up military conquest with demographic conquest. However, Israeli statements as to the role of settlements in security and defense policy are contradictory.

Harkabi addresses the role of settlements in war, drawing on *The Defense Line in Judea and Samaria,* written by Aryeh Shalev, a brigadier general in the reserves and scholar at the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University: «During the War of Independence no settlement, except for Nirim, withstood the onslaught of a regular Arab army without the aid of the Israeli army. Even with regular day-to-day security, settlements are more of a liability than an asset because they require forces to guard them and because they are a provocation to the Arab population. The settlements increase rather than decrease the need for Israeli military efforts... And let us not forget that sophisticated intelligence-gathering tools are increasingly able to provide Israel with warnings of an Arab invasion long before settlements could sound the alarm» (op. cit., p. 124).

«Until 1977, Labor-dominated governments tended to emphasize the trip-wire and antiterrorist functions of settlements and concentrated the settlement effort in the Jordan Valley, to which Labor security doctrine ascribed paramount importance. Even within this framework, the immediate security value of civilian settlements (as opposed to military outposts) was a subject of dispute, and settlement policy was arguably as much a product of the government's territorial aspirations... »

(Heller, op. cit., p. 112). Moshe Dayan is one of many Israeli leaders who has dismissed the security value of settlements.

As of 1982, there were 110 Zionist settlements, housing between 20-25,000 settlers, in the 1967 occupied territories (*Al Fajr,* December 10, 1982). The 1981 Labor party platform specified the following as indispensible security zones: the settlements in the Jordan Valley, the Etzion Bloc (southeast of Bethlehem) and a Jerusalem Bloc stretching eastwards to the Maale Adumin settlement complex.

Mroz's book cites military officers who still contend that settlements have value as an early warning system, as sealing the borders to «terrorists» and providing up-front units on the spot (along the Jordan Valley). But he also cites a defense analyst speaking of the Golan Heights, site of the largest concentration of Israeli settlements in the 1967 occupied territories, as saying, «One can make a good case that security is not the major purpose of these settlements» (op. cit., p. 174). Mroz also cites Israeli polls made in 1978 and 1979, showing that «some 69.8 percent of Israelis believed that peace within secure and recognized borders was more important than the right to settle on the West Bank and Gaza» (op. cit., p. 156).

While few would maintain that settlements have major military significance in the face of a real war, there is no doubt they play a sustained role in «the war within» which is in reality more closely related to the demographic battle. When he was defense minister, Ariel Sharon said that settlements were the «Zionist response to the menace of establishment of a Palestinian state and to Soviet expansionism in the Middle East» (as quoted in the *Journal of Palestine Studies,* Spring 1983). At a time when many Israelis were disturbed by the possibility of the autonomy plan being implemented in a way that they viewed as tantamount to a Palestinian state, Dan Horowitz wrote in *Yediot Aharonot* (June 6,1980): «From this point of view, there is no importance in the fact that some of the settlements are like ghost towns. The main thing is that when the time comes it will be possible to mobilize Jewish masses to prevent the evacuation of the settlements and maybe even defend them with arms. And if, in spite of everything, some arrangement is found for the period of autonomy, it will be possible to operate from these bases to prevent it, and this violence will be disguised as self-defense.»

Today, this appears as a premonition of the settlers' increasing brutality and provocations against the masses of the intifada; the outcome of this confrontation will surely have a decisive impact on the issue of whether settlements provide security to Israelis or the opposite.

SECURITY FROM ABROAD

Israeli security has always depended to an abnormal degree on its international relations (including with Jewish communities around the world), and aid from the imperialist center in particular. The average Israeli is highly cognizant of this fact, whether he likes it or not, despite the rhetorical bravado of some like Dayan and Sharon about Israel «going it alone.» Ironically, these two have been in the forefront of Israeli efforts to garner military aid and strategic cooperation from the US.

«Israel's best friends include the strongest nations. The United States showed a great constancy of support, interrupted